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Abstract
Nowadays, most commercial aircraft use systems with innovative technologies and
unprecedented infrastructure of avionics applications which include cyber technologies. Airplane
passengers are now using aviation cyber technologies when purchasing tickets, checking in at the
airline counter, passing through airport security, and connecting to Wi-Fi and the embedded inflight entertainment system.
Cyber technologies and connectivity expose aviation to a dangerous and costly world of
cyber threats that pose a major challenge of an attack which makes the risks difficult to
understand or to define. In addition, the opportunities for attacks continually grow as new
services and systems are developed. This thesis looks at understanding these cybersecurity
threats and countermeasures of avionics network systems, and their associated defense safety
mechanisms and risk analysis will help to pave a secure path toward the increase of protection of
our future aviation.

i

Chapter 1: Introduction
Aviation industries have begun to increase connectivity and digitization in their
applications. But this computer interconnectivity from the manufacturers to aircraft puts the
aviation industry at risk, similar to the cyber threats that other industries have already
experienced. In addition, some pilots and navigators started to replace their traditional flight bag
with an electronic flight bag (EFB) tablet, while airlines have started offering more enjoyable
services in the in-flight entertainment systems (IFE) through Wi-Fi. Aircraft maintenance
operations have also begun to navigate electronic manuals.
Computer interconnectivity from the manufacturers to the aircraft puts the aviation
industry at a greater security and privacy risk just like other industries such as technology and
telecommunication that have already experienced cyber threats in the past. Each new
technological advancement gives hackers a potential doorway. Similar to other industries, the
commercial aviation industry is progressively increasing and developing more computers and
networks in their applications. With the increased digital connectivity of the aviation system, and
its transformation into a globally connected technical system, any small cybersecurity threats on
the aviation operating system have the potential of causing rapid global spread, whether this be
with security and safety of passengers or at the corporate reputation and economic loss level.

1.1. Problem Statement
With the technology expansion in aviation comes the problem of security and privacy
risks that emerge from cyberattacks. There is a growing threat from the use of technologies that
may hinder the efficiency of operations. Therefore, the protection of avionics systems from
malicious, unauthorized access and destructive activity has become a top priority to guarantee
1

safety and privacy. According to "AVIATION CYBERSECURITY Scoping the Challenge"
Report [1], there is a negative impact on expanding the digitization network of aircraft data
systems with the internet. It threatens the cybersecurity of the aircraft and it can make them more
vulnerable to data corruption and increase the number of vulnerabilities that can occur which
threaten the aviation safety system. As a result, commercial aviation cybersecurity threats may
have a serious impact and can lead to a hacker gaining control of the aircraft and disrupting its
movement while flying.

1.2. Objective
In the thesis, I examine the recent technological advancements that the aviation industry
has undergone and the extent to which they have improved the operational efficiency in the
industry. More importantly, I address the cyber risks to which the industry has been exposed as a
result of the progressive implementation of new technologies. This thesis addresses specific
threats such as attacking critical systems, malware infection, vulnerabilities in the flight
electronic devices being used by pilots. In order to develop a better understanding of the
problem, the thesis discusses the evolution of cyberattacks: That is, how the attacks have
changed over the years with the new developments in technology. Understanding the risk
exposure also requires an appreciation of the models that have been advanced to explain the
concept of cyber-risks and the extent of damage they can have on systems. Although there have
been expansive studies on cybersecurity and potential threats that new technologies present to
organizations, little has been done to examine the exposure of the aviation industry to the threats.
This thesis aims to improve the existing studies by narrowing down the aviation industry as one
of the sectors that are at a greater risk of cyberattacks. The vulnerability of the industry to
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cyberattacks informs the study to explore the risk management framework and safety systems
models that can be employed to improve the security and privacy of the aviation industry as it
strives to connect people across the world.

1.3. Thesis Structure and Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, there is a review
of previous literature on cyber-attacks from a broader perspective. The review highlights some of
the fundamental advancements that have been achieved in response to the attacks. There is an
assessment of attacks in the aviation industry. Chapter 3 presents the proposed security system
for avionics applications. Specifically, it identifies the threats and explains how STRIDE and
DREAD models can be used for classifying the threats and rating and analyzing the risks. In
chapter 4, there is a discussion of the proposed system safety hazard and risk analysis. It presents
an analysis of hazards in the industry and how they contribute to risks. Chapter 5 presents a
conclusion of the study and recommendations for future research in the field.

3

Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter discusses previous cyber-attack literature from a broader perspective.

2.1 . Evolution of Cyber Attacks
The advent of the internet and subsequent advancements in mobile and computer
technology has seen a significant rise in cyber-risks that threaten the security and privacy of
personal data. The growth in cyber-attacks on personal platforms, corporate databases, and
government infrastructure is an indication of the extent of risk exposure to different forms of
databases [2]. The concept of cyber-attack has attracted the attention of several scholars with
most studies addressing the evolution in cyberattacks and the threats that the intrusions impose
on organizations and governments [3]; [2]; [4]; [5]. These studies have made a significant
contribution to the growing body of literature in the field. The current research is aimed at
building the existing literature by reviewing the previous studies with a goal of identifying
potential gaps that would inform further research to boost an understanding of the concepts.
Nagpal examined the evolution of cyber-attacks from the time earliest forms of
computers were developed in around 3500 B.C [6]. The author argued that error of modern
computers created an array of analytical engines with much exposure to cyber-threats such as
hacking. The advancements in computers that have been characterized by the development of
neural networks and Nano-computing technologies increase the exposure of corporate databases
and governments’ critical infrastructure to potential attacks. According to Nagpal [6], the recent
cyber-attacks such as the targeted denial of service access in Estonia increases the fears over the
extent to which cyberattacks could hamper the efficiency of service delivery in different sectors.
As technologies advance, cybercriminals are also in the race to update their wares for targeted
attacks. Nagpal called for a coordinated approach in developing systems that could prevent
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possible attacks in the future [6]. The involvement of intelligence agencies can be critical in
detecting the potential attacks before their actual execution. This can help in reducing the
adverse attacks on individuals, governments, and corporate organizations. Moreover, as cybercrime evolves, the cost associated with the attacks also continues to rise. Nagpal asserted that the
attacks often lead to loss of huge data that yield losses not only for governments but also for
corporate entities [6]. For instance, in the Estonia attack, the denial of services resulted in an
interruption of operations with massive losses of revenues. The popular “Operation Firewall”
attack that occurred in 2004 in the U.S resulted in a loss of more than $.7 million from credit
cards. It was also characterized by identity thefts and loss of personal and corporate documents
[6]. The negative consequences associated with the attacks call for immediate and elaborate
action that would prevent potential occurrences and reduce the costs associated with the attacks.
An RSA presentation discussed the evolution of cyber-attacks and recommended threat
protection of the next generation. [5] The author recognized that today’s attacks are not only
complex, but also successful. As such, they present organizations with evolving threat scenarios
with which they are less prepared to encounter. Arguably, these threats have bypassed the
traditional security protection systems that organizations still use [5]. In the early 2000s, most of
the cyberattacks were in the form of disruptions where attackers used worms and viruses to
infect databases and computer systems. Although these attacks had a notable impact on
organizations and individuals, they were less hazardous compared to the current threats. As
technologies continued to advance, the attacks were developed into spyware or bots. They were
largely classified as cybercrimes due to the magnitude of their impact on personal data for
corporate organizations and government. The last decade has been characterized by aggressive
advancements in the attacks. The current attacks are largely in the form of cyber-espionage and
cybercrime. These are characterized by dynamic Trojans, stealth bots, advanced persistent
5

threats, and zero-day targeted attacks. The attacks are not only complex but more costly for
organizations compared to the earlier forms of attacks.
The cybercrime landscape has significantly changed over the last two decades. From a
persistent coordinated threat to dynamic and polymorphic malware, systems are being exposed to
more advanced threats than ever before [5]. The attacks are in the form of multi-vector and
multi-stage [5]. This scholar argues that multiple vector attacks target valuable assets of an
entity, and they include spear phishing, web-based, and file-based attacks. In spear phishing, the
target is often on financial information while web-based attacks target intellectual property of
different entities [5]. By contrast, multi-stage attacks focus on the exploitation of systems and
data exfiltration. Malware is spread vertically, where a download of executable malware is
completed by an unsuspecting system user. Aziz recommended the need to adopt a new model to
counter cyberattacks. Specifically, he recommended a legacy pattern-matching detection model
[5]. The model is effective as it is signature-based and reactive [5]. However, it is limited by the
fact that it can only combat known threats, and, considering the threats continue to evolve, it may
be inefficient to guarantee full system or data protection. A virtual execution model can also be
relevant in protecting private information [4].

2.2 . Cyber Attacks in the Global Aviation Industry
The aviation industry is at greater risk of cyber-attacks owing to its unique operations and
the extensive reliance on technologies to support operations such as air traffic control, airport
control and coordination, and human resource management. The industry employs technologies
such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and the Internet of Things (IoT). The overreliance on
these technologies exposes the industry to huge risks that could lead to significant damages in
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economic and technical terms. Additionally, the sensitivity of the industry to security also makes
it at high risk for cyberattacks. The susceptibility of the industry to cyber risks has attracted the
attention of different scholars. There is a growing body of literature that attempts to examine the
reasons behind the industry’s high exposure [7]; [8]; [9]; [10]; [11].
Lekota and Coetzee explored the incidence response to cybersecurity threats in the SubSaharan African aviation industry [12]. The study recognizes the growing threat that cyber-risks
pose to the safety and security of the global aviation system. Some of the attacks identified by
the researchers include malicious damage to ICT system, espionage, and theft of information
[12]. According to the authors, the threats present huge losses to the aviation industry and are a
potential threat to the reliability and safety of the air aviation industry. The growing
interconnection of the aviation industry where there is an overreliance on computer-based
information technology presents adverse challenges that hinder the efficient growth of the
industry [12]. Between 2016 and 2018, there were several cases of cyberattacks in the industry
[12]. The attacks varied from terrorism, spying, hackers exploiting loopholes and vulnerabilities
of systems, and phishing for financial gains. Lekota and Coetzee recommended a collaborative
approach where there is a sharing of responsibilities among different stakeholders in the industry
[12]. They argued that the approach would help optimize the safety of the airspace. A
coordinated approach to cybersecurity is also necessary for minimizing the risk exposure as each
party would focus on their designated areas. It would also create room for innovation that leads
to the development of more advanced systems for managing the threats.
According to Lykou, Anagnostopoulou, and Gritzalis, the growing number of air travel
passengers per year has necessitated the adoption of technologies in the management and
operations of most airports in the globe [13]. From inspection to surveillance of airports,
technologies play an important role in enhancing the security of the global aviation industry.
7

However, the industry is not without risks that threaten the efficiency of operations. The IoT in
airport facilities, for instance, present increasing challenges that affect the industry operations.
The increased use of smartphones by employees and travelers increases the level of exposure to
different threats such as phishing. Personal information such as credit card information is getting
exposed to cyber-risks as most travelers prefer card transactions. Although the smart airport has
presented notable contributions to the operations of airport facilities, the risk exposures call for
action that would reduce the level of exposure and improve the safety and privacy of personal
information of both travelers and employees.
Lykou, Anagnostopoulou, and Gritzalis also conducted research on the implementation of
cybersecurity measures in airports as a way of improving resilience to cyber-attacks [11].
According to the authors, some of the potential threats include diversion of flights, interruption
of system operations, and collapsing the operating systems. These forms of interruption can
result in fatal crashes in airspaces. They can also result in the loss of airplanes in airspace.
Lykou, Anagnostopoulou, and Gritzalis recommended the adoption of robust cybersecurity
governance in smart airports [11]. The researchers also recommended a well-coordinated
approach in the management of airport operations. Smart airports not only improve the efficiency
of operations but also reduce the costs that airports incur in their daily operations. Nonetheless,
without a proper cybersecurity system, the industry could suffer huge losses from the threats.
Rudner presented cybersecurity as an intelligence challenge for the aviation industry [8].
There have been attempts to develop systems that help in providing information on the possible
cyberthreats that may hinder the efficiency of airport operations. Although some of the efforts
have yielded positive outcomes in developing nations, there are different challenges in
intelligence gathering in developing nations [8]. Rudner further recommended a comprehensive
approach that involves the participation of different stakeholders in the development of security
8

systems [8]. There is a need for governments to invest in intelligence as a way of collecting
critical information that can help in the management of airport operations and eliminate the
potential attacks that may affect performance [10]. The aviation industry is at a greater risk of
cyber-attacks, particularly with the advancements in technologies.
According to Rudner, intensive investment in security systems will create internal
structures that will minimize risk exposure [8]. At the governmental level, critical infrastructure
is also at a greater risk of attack. Rudner asserted that airport facilities are part of critical
infrastructure due to the important role that they play in the economic growth of countries.
Various airlines across the globe are owned by the government, making them part of the critical
infrastructure that can be used to improve efficiency [8]. Intelligence efforts should be focused
towards creating effective security systems that will detect and prevent potential cyberattacks
that may yield losses for the industry. The denial-of-service attack exposed a weakness in the
system, the reliance on an infrastructure’s unfailing availability. It was a result of the limitations
of the current technologies utilized in the industry. Recent reports of remote hacking aimed at
airlines, airports, and air traffic management systems suggest that there are only increasing cyber
risks; airport passport control, airline flight crews, and baggage control systems are frequent
targets.
According to Duchamp, Bayram, and Korhani [7], cybersecurity presents a major
challenge for the aviation industry across the globe. The increasing threats of cybercrimes due to
advancements in technologies present unprecedented challenges to the industry. The authors
recommended a legislative approach towards the management of cyber threats in the industry
[7]. They recommended that governments should formulate policies that will work towards
enhancing the privacy and security of private data in the airport database systems. A legislative
approach gives a less effective strategy in the management of cyber-risks. The increasing
9

evolution of cyber-attacks is making it difficult for governments to develop legislation that will
produce effective outcomes such as enhanced security in the aviation industry. Arguably,
legislation often does not have a timely manner to be passed because of the technological
advances before it is passed and/or implemented. Legislation is aimed to pursue cyber attackers,
as general legislation, and it will not specifically address cyberattacks in commercial aviation.
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that occupy the airspace also present
notable challenges to the aviation industry. Previous studies have shown UAVs affect the
efficient movement of airplanes as they may get into plane engines and could lead to a potential
crash. According to Hartmann and Steup, UAVs are often used by terrorists to attack specific
target locations [14]. Airports are some of the soft targets where drone technology is largely
applied by terrorists to execute attacks. Although the technologies have had a positive impact on
the delivery and logistics industry, they present a threat to the operational efficiency of the
aviation industry [15]. UAVs are also used in the surveillance of airport facilities for targeted
attacks, increasing the risk exposures.

10

Chapter 3: Security System for Avionics Applications
Security countermeasure is a critical component of the aviation industry. Securing both
aircraft internal and external connectivity has become an operational requirement to avoid any
cyber threats while also expanding digitization in avionics systems. Wherefore, an airplane's
operations management and safety need a security system that can reduce potential threats that
avionics applications may face, as well as, facilitate the achievement of security objectives of
any organization. This thesis proposes a security system that identifies and classifies all sorts of
risks. The said security system develops risk ratings and analysis which aim to reduce the
dangerous cyber threats in commercial avionics. Figure 1 elaborates the process of the proposed
system.

Figure (1): Proposed Security System Model for Avionics Applications

3.1.

Identification of Threats

Threat identification is the first rule to adhere for the security process after the
applications analysis step is complete. There are some application threats defined in this

11

proposed system and different techniques and methods that are employed by attackers
which can affect the avionics systems in commercial aviation as shown in figure (2).

Figure (2): E-enabled Connected Aircraft Security Threats [17]

Threat 1: [16]
Threat ID
Threat Description

1
Attacking Critical Systems via In-Flight Entertainment Systems
[16]

Threat Target

To gain control of the IFE system, or potentially crash an aircraft
while in flight.

Attack Techniques

Search for security holes, install software before flight take off,
and use established vulnerabilities.

Countermeasures

Secure memory, secure communication, and secure run-time
environments between internal aircraft components.
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Threat 2: [16]
Threat ID

2

Threat Description

Malware Infection over Wireless External Interfaces (2012) [16]

Threat Target

Potential Damage without much effort.

Attack Techniques

Automatic infection with malware from one aircraft to another
using the external communication channels.

Countermeasures

Secure and updated firewalls.

Threat 3: [16]
Threat ID
Threat Description

3
Attacking Aircraft via Compromised Information Technology
Infrastructures (2011) [16]

Threat Target

Damage connection network to the aircrafts

Attack Techniques

Use any point in the airport infrastructures which has system
venerability to get connected to the aircrafts.

Countermeasures

Everything connected to the aircraft is secure, employee’s
awareness and training programs for potential cyber-attacks,
update systems continuously

Threat 4: [16]
Threat ID
Threat Description

4
Vulnerabilities in Commercial-Off-the-Shelf-Based Electronic
Flight Bags (EFB) [16]

Threat Target

Get access to electronic documentation of the airline’s manuals.

Attack Techniques

Finding vulnerabilities in devices used by the pilot’s devices,
social engineering.

Countermeasures

Develop trustable protection measures for secure EFB integration
that are completely specified, implemented, and approved, and
update systems continuously
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3.2

Using STRIDE Model for Classification of Threats
After the identification of potential threats, these types of vulnerabilities are

classified by the method of STRIDE that was introduced by Microsoft. STRIDE is used as
a solid system to characterize these vulnerabilities and security countermeasures. This
characterization of vulnerabilities and security countermeasures can reduce potential risks
during the engagements of security and privacy. Thus, the classification of potential threats
using STRIDE methodology reduces the number of arguments about classification. It
indicates that STRIDE comprehends the characteristics of any vulnerability which is
caused by attackers.
Abbreviation of STRIDE:
● Spoofing: Impact related to Authentication
● Tampering: Impact related to Integrity
● Repudiation: Impact related to Non-Repudiation
● Information disclosure: Impact related to Confidentiality
● Denial of service: Impact related to Availability
● Elevation of Privilege: Impact related to Authorization
Threats Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information Denial of
ID

Identity

with data

Disclosure

Service
✓

1
✓

2
3

✓

✓

4

✓

✓

✓

Elevation of
Privilege
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

Table (1): STRIDE threat classification for analysis
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After the analysis for STRIDE threat classification Table 1, Threat 1 is classified as
Denial of Service to break down the IFE systems or potentially crash an aircraft while in
flight. Threat 1 is also classified as an Elevation of Privilege for an attacker who can be
authorized using the stolen user seed. As we go through each Threat, this method will help
to characterize each threat based on its measurement of the STRIDE threat model. It is very
advantageous to know the kind of attack which is being posed by the attacker. It also
enables us to know about the severity of the threat.

3.3

Using DREAD-Model for Rating Risk
It may be difficult to fully agree with co-workers on the chosen ratings by using a

simplified rating framework. Therefore, to ease this difficulty, additional measurements are
added to help figure out the effect of security threats. The DREAD model is used to help
figure out the probability of risk, which is abbreviated as Damage Potential,
Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, and Discoverability. By following the
accompanying questions, each given threat can be rated:
•

Damage potential – How great is the damage if the vulnerability is exploited?
o 1 = Nothing will be affected.
o 2 = Individual user data will be affected.
o = Every user data will be affected.

•

•

Reproducibility – How easy is it to reproduce the attack?
o

1 = Very hard or impossible

o

2 = One or more steps required, may need to be an authorized user.

o

3 = Malicious app, No need of authentication.

Exploitability – How easy is it to launch an attack?
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o 1 = Complicated programming, deep knowledge, and advanced attack tools.
o 2 = Malware exists on the Internet, or an exploit can be easily completed
using available attack tools.
o 3 = Easy malware or native application
•

•

Affected users – As a rough rate, how many users are affected?
o

1 = None

o

2 = Some users, but not all

o

3 = All users

Discoverability – How easy is it to find the vulnerability?
o 1 = Very difficult to impossible; requires additional source code or
administrative authentication access.
o 2 = Can be found by guessing or by analyzing the application data flow.
o = Details of faults like this are already in the public domain and can be easily
discovered using a search engine.
The previous scale is rating every threat risk by using a straightforward plan of
risk rating, which include High (3), Medium (2), and Low (1). Characterizing risk
rates in this model will make it easy to perform more clear risk analysis.

3.4

Using DREAD-Model for Risk Analysis
After defining the questions and qualities (1 to 3) for each given threat, the

outcome can be in the scope of 5 to 15. At that point, threat dangers with general
evaluations can be given as the following:
o (12 to 15) => High Risk.
o (8 to 11) => Medium Risk.
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o (5 to 7) => Low Risk.
Priority is given for each threat in the following way to analyze the risk factor from first
to last:
o First: High Risk
o Second: Medium Risk.
o Last: Low Risk.
Given threats: [16]
1. Attacking Critical Systems via In-Flight Entertainment Systems.
2. Malware Infection over Wireless External Interfaces.
3. Attacking Aircraft via Compromised Information Technology Infrastructures.
4. Vulnerabilities in Commercial EFB system.
Risk DREAD = D+R+E+A+D / 5
Threats

D

R

E

A

D

Total

Rating

Threat 1

3

3

1

2

1

10

Second: Medium Risk

Threat 2

3

3

2

3

1

12

First: High Risk

Threat 3

3

2

1

2

1

9

Second: Medium Risk

Threat 4

2

1

2

1

1

7

Last: Low Risk

ID

Table 2: DREAD rating result for all threats

As Table 2 indicates, Threat 2 becomes the first high risk based on the calculation
of D+R+E+A+D risk rating. Outcomes of Threat 1 and 3 are indicated as second high risk
while Threat 4 is the last low risk. The method of DREAD model is implemented for
comparing, rating, and prioritizing the severity of risk that is caused by given threats that
are classified and narrated by using STRIDE model.
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Chapter 4: System Safety Hazard and Risk Analysis:
Any current or possible condition which may cause injury or death, damage or failure of
a device, structure or property, or environmental damage is a hazard. More often, the hazard is
used to describe scenarios that may cause harm to the system. This chapter introduces a proposed
system safety model for hazards and risk analysis in avionics applications. This system has two
main stages which are hazard analysis and risk reduction management. The main objectives of
this system are to make sure that we meet the system's safety requirements to avoid or respond to
any potential hazard that may cause harm to the system.

Figure 3: Proposed System Safety Process Model

4.1.

Hazard Analysis
Recognizing the potential and severe threats and hazards from a large number of

internal and external sources in avionics networks is an important matter. Therefore, by
testing similar existing systems or by thinking of worst-case what-if scenarios, safety
operators can avoid hazards that may occur due to the consideration of who, what, where,
when, why, and how. These scenarios deliver the knowledge about the condition and the
significances that will be used during risk analysis. Generally, threats and hazards are first
18

described in the hazard classification list as described in Table 3, and, after that, they are
merged in groups for further analysis.

Hazard

Hazard

Hazard Causes

ID
1

Hazard Effects/
Consequences

Critical aircraft avionics

Cyber-attack in on non-

Plane crash, civil

systems crash

isolated system connected

disaster

to critical systems
2

Malfunction in the

Automatic infection with

Flight stops and

aircraft communication

malware

delays, financial

systems
3

losses

Malfunction in boarding

Cyber-attack in the

services

infrastructure network at

Air traffic breakdown

the airport
4

Malfunction in Airport

Malware attack to

No public internet

Public Wi-Fi

breakdown the service

access

Table 3: Avionics Systems Hazards

4.2.

Risk Analysis and Assessment
The likelihood of the avionics systems hazards shown in Table 3 are acquired using

the rating likelihood occurrence levels described in Table 4. In the same way, the severity
of the avionics network effects of Table 3 are acquired using the severity rating levels of
Table 5. The measurement scale for quantitative evaluations for both tables are on a 1-10
scale. 1 is the least unlikely occurrence or no relevant effect, and 10 is the most frequent
occurrence or catastrophic effect.
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Rating

Qualitative Evaluation

Quantitative Evaluation

A

Unlikely occurrence

1-2

B

Remote occurrence

3-4

C

Occasional occurrence

5-6

D

Repeated occurrence

7-8

E

Frequent occurrence

9-10

Table 4: Hazard Causes Evaluation Model
Rating

Qualitative Evaluation

Quantitative Evaluation

I

No relevant effect on avionics network

1-2

II

Very minor effect on avionics network

3-4

III

Minor effect on avionics network

5-6

IV

Major effect on avionics network

7-8

V

Catastrophic effect on avionics network

9-10

Table 5: Hazard Effects Evaluation Model

In the process of risk analysis, it is crucial to comprehend the characteristics of
threats and hazards on the basis of the severity of hazard effects and occurrence likelihood.
The level and extent of risks can be obtained by using the matrix of Risk Assessment. The
risk assessment is obtained by merging the severity of hazard with the likelihood of
occurrence for each of the given hazards. The qualitative risk assessment is obtained by
20

using the risk assessment matrix of Table 6, and the quantitative risk assessment is obtained
by adjusting the quantitative results of risk, such that they can be determined on a 1-10
scale.
A

B

C

D

E

I

Low

Low

Low

Moderate

High

II

Low

Low

Moderate

High

High

III

Low

Moderate

Moderate

High

Very high

IV

Low

Moderate

High

Very high

Very high

V

Moderate

High

Very high

Very high

Very high

Table 6: Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix

The low-risk cells in the Risk Assessment Matrix of Table 6 indicate a low risk to be
affected by cyber threats in avionics systems. Consequently, the risk increases to moderate,
high, and very high, which indicates that there is an increased risk of potential cyber threats
in avionics systems. Thus, we can evaluate the hazard by using data from risk level. Either
it meets the system safety requirements and objectives or it needs to be reprocessed again.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research Recommendations
In this chapter, I conclude this thesis, and then I discuss future research tasks.

5.1. Conclusion
Aviation is at the forefront of technological expansion, and that is because the number of
air travel passengers is exponentially increasing every year. As a result, airline companies
enhance their technology innovation plan and develop smart services to support growth and
efficiency by offering an enjoyable travel experience. Additional challenges and risks are coming
up, which aviation has to deal with and adjust to, such as integrating connectivity in airplanes
and the increased use of smart devices from aviation industries and passengers.
In the thesis, I have proposed a security system to identify the threats in the aviation
application. By applying the STRIDE and the DREAD models, we can mitigate the risks in
cybersecurity. The proposed structure works by identifying the objectives of the application and
then looks for the threats in the application. And, at the end, it applies different security measures
like STRIDE to do the risk and hazard analysis and mitigates the threats.
Cybersecurity is becoming an important factor for safety, which is essential in the
aviation field. By implementing cybersecurity standards and solutions in cybersecurity threats of
avionics network systems, their associated defense mechanisms will help to pave a secure path
toward the increase of protection of our future aviation.
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5.2.

Future Research Recommendations
There is a need for future research and work to identify areas that are accessible to cyber

attackers when they are on aircrafts and define the vulnerability of NextGen in new and old
aircrafts. Additional research is needed on how the aircraft manufacturers install the internal
aircraft wiring, focusing on the aircraft's network, and how it will provide a better assessment of
these areas of vulnerability. Future research should focus on how possible it is for a terrorist
attacker to take control of the plane while in the air, as seen in Chris Robert’s YouTube video in
which he illustrated taking control of the aircraft and moving it sideways. One of the largest
questions there is regarding wireless access is, does a passenger have access to the aircraft
network and access flight control?
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